Twenty-five years ago it was common practice to bring about the deaths of some children with learning disabilities or physical impairments. This paper considers a small number of landmark cases in the early 1980s that confronted this practice. These cases illustrate a process by which external forces (social, philosophical, political, and professional) moved through the legal system to effect a profound change outside that system – primarily in the (then) largely closed domain of medical conduct/practice. These cases are considered from a socio-legal perspective. In particular, the paper analyses the reasons why they surfaced at that time, the social and political contexts that shaped the judgments, and their legacy.
This paper examines the historical role of law and politics in the adoption of smallpox vaccination in Britain, focusing primarily on the early Victorian period, when legislation was passed to enforce compulsory infantile vaccination. The primary thesis of the study is that law, and the processes through which it is created and maintained, provide a distinct “envelope of social order” (Jasanoff 2008, 764) within which competing and duelling interests and opinions about scientific innovation find origin, expression, and debate. Consequently, the manner in which law responds to science and its impact on society is neither static nor self-evident, but subject to mutable circumstances that are historically, politically, and socially situated. The paper is divided into two main parts. The first provides a brief history of vaccination and the second focuses on events surrounding the introduction of compulsory vaccination laws in England and Wales.
The landmark decision of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority was a victory for advocates of adolescent autonomy. It established a test by which the court could measure children's competence with a view to them authorising medical treatment. However, application of the test by clinicians reveals a number of ambiguities which are compounded by subsequent interpretation of Gillick in the law courts. What must be understood by minors in order for them to be deemed competent? At what point in the consent process should competence be assessed? Does competence confer on minors the authority to refuse as well as to accept medical treatment? These are questions which vex clinicians, minors and their families. A growing number of commentators favour application of parts of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to minors. In this paper, the limitations of this approach are exposed and more radical reform is proposed.