Hannah Jones has refused the heart transplant that could save her life. But is a 13-year-old too young to make that decision? Or is she the only person who can?
The landmark decision of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority was a victory for advocates of adolescent autonomy. It established a test by which the court could measure children's competence with a view to them authorising medical treatment. However, application of the test by clinicians reveals a number of ambiguities which are compounded by subsequent interpretation of Gillick in the law courts. What must be understood by minors in order for them to be deemed competent? At what point in the consent process should competence be assessed? Does competence confer on minors the authority to refuse as well as to accept medical treatment? These are questions which vex clinicians, minors and their families. A growing number of commentators favour application of parts of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to minors. In this paper, the limitations of this approach are exposed and more radical reform is proposed.
Good Medical Practice describes what is expected of all doctors registered with the GMC. The guidance that follows, which is for all doctors, develops the duties and principles set out in Good Medical Practice and in our other guidance. It focuses on children and young people from birth until their 18th birthday
A terminally-ill 13-year-old girl has persuaded a hospital to abandon legal action that could have forced her to have a potentially life-saving heart transplant against her will. Hannah Jones, who suffers from a rare form of leukaemia, told doctors that she believed the treatment was too risky and that she would prefer to enjoy her remaining days in the company of family and friends. But in complex right-to-die case, her local hospital began High Court proceedings to temporarily remove her from her parents' custody to allow the transplant to go ahead.
PUTTE, Belgium—In this small village amid an array of Flemish farms, they were an unusual but seemingly happy pair, two 43-year-olds who were identical, deaf twins. Townspeople recalled seeing Marc and Eddy Verbessem around town frequently, talking animatedly in sign language together, tooling around in a small blue car, and regularly buying two copies of a popular gossip magazine. No one expected them to decide to die on purpose.
A father whose son was born with a rare neuromuscular condition will go to the high court tomorrow in an attempt to stop a hospital withdrawing the support that keeps the child alive. Doctors treating the one-year-old say the boy's quality of life is so poor that it would not be in his best interests to save him. They are reportedly being supported in their action by the baby's mother, who is separated from his father. The child, known for legal reasons as Baby RB, was born with congenital myasthenic syndrome (CMS), a muscle condition that severely limits movement and the ability to breathe independently. He has been in hospital since birth. If the hospital succeeds in its application, it will be the first time a British court has gone against the wishes of a parent and ruled that life support can be discontinued or withdrawn from a child who does not have brain damage.
The Dutch system designed to protect from prosecution doctors who are involved in the mercy killing of severely ill newborn babies who are judged to be suffering unbearably and hopelessly seems to be struggling to gain professional acceptance. The first case is only now being considered, more than two years after the system’s introduction. Research had estimated there should be 15 to 20 such cases a year (New England Journal of Medicine 2005;352:959-62). MPs learnt through parliamentary questions on 18 November that the first report of the decision to end the life of a severely ill baby had been filed in the Netherlands. No more details have been released. The expert committee set up to monitor the system has 12 weeks to decide if the doctor involved followed the correct protocol and whether it should recommend that he or she is not prosecuted.
Twenty-five years ago it was common practice to bring about the deaths of some children with learning disabilities or physical impairments. This paper considers a small number of landmark cases in the early 1980s that confronted this practice. These cases illustrate a process by which external forces (social, philosophical, political, and professional) moved through the legal system to effect a profound change outside that system – primarily in the (then) largely closed domain of medical conduct/practice. These cases are considered from a socio-legal perspective. In particular, the paper analyses the reasons why they surfaced at that time, the social and political contexts that shaped the judgments, and their legacy.