There has been a paradigm shift in terms of thinking about errors. In the aftermath of disasters, the lens of responsibility is being refocused away from people and towards (work) places. Institutions not individuals, processes rather than persons are becoming the focus of investigation. The search for scapegoats is beginning to look crass and ineffective. This is reflected in the formal responses to these events, such as public inquiries, which now routinely focus on system responsibility. Whilst systems analysis has obvious merits it also raises important and unresolved questions. In particular, what are the risks of this shift towards systems thinking? What are the implications for individual professional responsibility? Will the commitment to systems responsibility be meaningful in practice? First, however, we must sketch the contention and connotation of different descriptions of error episodes and appreciate the true toll of the error problem in medicine.
Italy introduced legislation in 2004 governing assisted reproduction. Before then, the legislative vacuum that existed in Italy had de facto rendered all scientific techniques lawful. That vacuum has now been filled by a controversial and retrogressive law, which permits access to assisted reproduction within very narrow confines. Access is limited to stable heterosexual couples of a fertile age who may use only their own, and not donor, gametes. The woman is under an obligation to have all created embryos, healthy or diseased, implanted.
In this paper, I discuss several arguments against non-therapeutic mutilation. Interventions into bodily integrity, which do not serve a therapeutic purpose and are not regarded as aesthetically acceptable by the majority, e.g. tongue splitting, branding and flesh stapling, are now practised, but, however, are still seen as a kind of 'aberration' that ought not to be allowed. I reject several arguments for a possible ban on these body modifications. I find the common pathologisation of body modifications, Kant's argument of duties to oneself and the objection from irrationality all wanting. In conclusion, I see no convincing support for prohibition of voluntary mutilations.
This paper examines the law relating to healthcare resource allocation in England. The National Health Service (NHS) Act 1977 does not impose an absolute duty to provide specified healthcare services. The courts will only interfere with a resource allocation decision made by an NHS body if that decision is frankly irrational (or where the decision infringes the principle of proportionality when a right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is engaged). Such irrationality is very difficult to establish. The ECHR has made no significant contribution to domestic English law in the arena of healthcare provision.
Do terminally ill patients who have exhausted all other available, government-approved treatment options have a constitutional right to experimental treatment that may prolong their lives? On May 2, 2006, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a startling opinion, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, held "Yes." The plaintiffs, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs and Washington Legal Foundation, sought to enjoin the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") from refusing to allow the sale of investigational new drugs that had not yet been FDA-approval for marketing.
Anorexia nervosa is often chronic, with one of the highest death rates for psychological conditions. Law can compel treatment, but is rarely invoked, at least formally (though the strategic possibilities of orders confers internal authority within the clinical setting). Instead, 'control' (or management) is exercised diffusely, through disciplinary practices embedded in everyday clinic life, such as daily routines of eating and washing, behavioural 'contracts', regular surveillance and measuring, interactions with staff, visits and activities.
Background: In Switzerland, non-medical right-to-die organisations such as Exit Deutsche Schweiz and Dignitas offer suicide assistance to members suffering from incurable diseases. Objectives: First, to determine whether differences exist between the members who received assistance in suicide from Exit Deutsche Schweiz and Dignitas. Second, to investigate whether the practices of Exit Deutsche Schweiz have changed since the 1990s. Conclusions: Weariness of life rather than a fatal or hopeless medical condition may be a more common reason for older members of Exit Deutsche Schweiz to commit suicide. The strong over-representation of women in both Exit Deutsche Schweiz and Dignitas suicides is an important phenomenon so far largely overlooked and in need of further study.
One difficulty in dealing with the concept of medical treatment in Canadian criminal law is to reconcile some of the dictates of the Criminal Code, which have ancient origins, with the reality of modern medicine. Such a situation arises when we ask whether a surgical operation is prima facie legal or illegal. This may be considered a rather narrow and esoteric question, but it has and will become increasingly important with the development of modern medical technology. The initial presumption of legality or illegality may determine the final characterization of a given medical intervention as lawful or unlawful. This is particularly important in such areas as non-therapeutic human medical research and live-donor organ transplantation. This enquiry explores the present situation in Canadian criminal law with respect to the legality of medical interventions and makes some recommendations for change.