Results: Laws on assisted dying in The Netherlands and Belgium are restricted to doctors. In principle, assisted suicide (but not euthanasia) is not illegal in either Germany or Switzerland, but a doctor’s participation in Germany would violate the code of professional medical conduct and might contravene of a doctor’s legal duty to save life. The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill proposed in the UK in 2005 focused on doctors, whereas the Proposal on Assisted Dying of the Norwegian Penal Code Commission minority in 2002 did not. Conclusion: A society moving towards an open approach to assisted dying should carefully identify tasks to assign exclusively to medical doctors, and distinguish those possibly better performed by other professions.
There has been a paradigm shift in terms of thinking about errors. In the aftermath of disasters, the lens of responsibility is being refocused away from people and towards (work) places. Institutions not individuals, processes rather than persons are becoming the focus of investigation. The search for scapegoats is beginning to look crass and ineffective. This is reflected in the formal responses to these events, such as public inquiries, which now routinely focus on system responsibility. Whilst systems analysis has obvious merits it also raises important and unresolved questions. In particular, what are the risks of this shift towards systems thinking? What are the implications for individual professional responsibility? Will the commitment to systems responsibility be meaningful in practice? First, however, we must sketch the contention and connotation of different descriptions of error episodes and appreciate the true toll of the error problem in medicine.
This paper examines the law relating to healthcare resource allocation in England. The National Health Service (NHS) Act 1977 does not impose an absolute duty to provide specified healthcare services. The courts will only interfere with a resource allocation decision made by an NHS body if that decision is frankly irrational (or where the decision infringes the principle of proportionality when a right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is engaged). Such irrationality is very difficult to establish. The ECHR has made no significant contribution to domestic English law in the arena of healthcare provision.
Why should we respect the wishes which individuals may have about how their body is treated after death? Reflecting on how and why the law respects the bodies of the living, we argue that we must also respect the ‘dead’. We contest the relevance of the argument ‘the dead have no interests’, rather we think that the pertinent argument is ‘the living have interests in what happens to their dead bodies’. And, we advance arguments why we should also respect the wishes of the relatives of the deceased regarding what happens to the bodies of their loved ones. In our analysis, we use objections to organ and tissue donation for conscientious reasons (often presented as religious reasons) to show why the living can have interests in their dead bodies, and those of their dead relatives, and why these interests should be respected.
Sky Television’s documentary showing an assisted suicide has provoked a storm in UK tabloids, but the medical ethicist Daniel K Sokol says it has reinforced his belief in the moral permissibility of helping people die in exceptional circumstances.
A leading British provider of abortions did not break the law when it told women who wanted late terminations about a clinic in Spain that would perform them, a report by Liam Donaldson, the chief medical officer for England, concluded last week. Professor Donaldson investigated the charity the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) after a newspaper reported that it was illegally referring women to Spain for abortions after 24 weeks’ gestation, the limit in Britain for abortions for "social" reasons. Professor Donaldson has decided that BPAS did not break the law by telling women about the Spanish clinic. But he criticised it for giving out the clinic’s telephone number too readily and for not giving appropriate advice to women seeking a late abortion.
The UK government has quietly dropped a passage in the draft handbook to the NHS constitution that said that ministers had decided to give researchers the right to trawl medical records for research participants without the need for patients’ consent. Organisations that are charged with safeguarding patient confidentiality had objected strongly to a section in the draft handbook that said, "Patients can . . . expect that a health professional or a research professional who owes the same duty of confidentiality as a health professional may use care records, in confidence, to identify whether they are suitable to participate in approved clinical trials. Appropriate patients will be notified of opportunities to join in, and will be free to choose whether they wish to do so, after a full explanation."
NICE has introduced new criteria for appraising end of life treatments. James Raftery looks at how they might affect availability by applying them to previously refused drugs
Concerns about data sharing may undermine doctors’ and patients’ confidence Committee stage discussions in parliament are currently under way on the Coroners and Justice Bill. Although most of the clauses relate to amendments to the coronial system, clause 152 is receiving substantial attention in the press. Clause 152 would allow all government departments to use a fast track procedure to share data without parliamentary debate. It includes a provision that allows ministers to "remove or modify any legal barrier to data sharing." The explanatory notes say that, "This could be by repealing or amending other primary legislation, changing any other rule of law (for example, the application of the common law to confidentiality to defined circumstances), or creating a new power to share information where that power is currently absent."
There is evidence from outside the UK to show that physicians’ religious beliefs influence their decision making at the end of life. This UK study explores the belief system of consultants, nurse key workers & specialist registrars & their attitudes to decisions which commonly must be taken when caring for individuals who are dying. Results showed that consultants’ religion & belief systems differed from those of nurses & the population they served. Consultants & nurses had statistically significant differences in their attitudes to common end of life decisions with consultants more likely to continue hydration & not withdraw treatment. Nurses were more sympathetic to the idea of PAS for unbearable suffering. This study shows the variability in belief system and attitudes to end of life decision making both within and between clinical groups. The personal belief system of consultants was not shown to affect their overall attitudes to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment or PAS.
While clearly a lot of work had gone into producing this report, a major concern for the British Medical Association is the way the report itself, and members of the Taskforce in presenting the report, discussed the evidence about the impact of presumed consent on donation rates.
Twenty-five years ago it was common practice to bring about the deaths of some children with learning disabilities or physical impairments. This paper considers a small number of landmark cases in the early 1980s that confronted this practice. These cases illustrate a process by which external forces (social, philosophical, political, and professional) moved through the legal system to effect a profound change outside that system – primarily in the (then) largely closed domain of medical conduct/practice. These cases are considered from a socio-legal perspective. In particular, the paper analyses the reasons why they surfaced at that time, the social and political contexts that shaped the judgments, and their legacy.
The subject raises issues as to the extent to which it is proper to treat adults with psychiatric or psychological disorders with radical surgery, particularly where the appropriate diagnosis and treatment of the underlying disorder is uncertain or disputed; the limitations which ought to be placed upon consent as a means of rendering surgery lawful and whether the criminal law ought to have a place in controlling operations provided by qualified surgeons upon competent adults with their consent.
The editorial by Ira Byock (1) commenting on the report from van den Block et al (2) correctly says that only 22 cases of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) occurred (1.3% of all 1690 non-sudden deaths), suggesting that this means these actions ‘occur relatively infrequently’. However, there were a further 26 cases of 'life ending drugs without patient request'. Readers should know that this latter category consists of doctors who answered the same question in the same way as the doctors who are counted as having provided euthanasia or PAS, except that in a subsequent question the doctors indicated that the patient had not asked for euthanasia at the time.
A fundamental aspect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is the statutory endorsement of a functional approach to capacity. In principle, this requires a separate assessment of capacity in respect of each decision to be made. Most capacity assessments take place at a non-judicial level, and, outside of day-to-day decisions, the most common assessors are likely to be healthcare professionals. This paper investigates the practical operation of the capacity assessment process at both judicial and non-judicial levels. It asks whether the process can deliver on the MCA's goal of preserving maximum decision-making freedom, while, at the same time, providing an appropriate degree of protection. It argues that assessors who are not legally trained encounter signific
by Edmund Christo. This paper is given the general purport of critically analyzing the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Legislation in certain Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions, or lack thereof, and is to conclude by proposing a way forward in dealing with jurisdictions that haven’t sought to make any changes to the prehistoric legislation governing this issue, or those that have made changes, and it can be said to be in need of reform.
A national survey of 3733 UK doctors reporting on the care of 2923 people who had died under their care is reported here. Results show that there was no time to make an ‘end-of-life decision’ (deciding to provide, withdraw or withhold treatment) for 8.5% of those reporting deaths. A further 55.2% reported decisions which they estimated would not hasten death and 28.9% reported decisions they had expected to hasten death. A further 7.4% reported deaths where they had to some degree intended to hasten death. Where patients or someone else had made a request for a hastened death, doctors were more likely to report expecting or at least partly intending to hasten death. Doctors usually made these decisions in consultation with colleagues, relatives and, where feasible, with patients.
Since 1991, sperm donors in the UK have had the legal right to withdraw consent for the use of their sperm in fertility treatment. This has the potential to adversely affect patients. It may mean that previous recipients of a donor’s sperm cannot have further children who are full biological siblings to an existing child, and that embryos created from the donor’s sperm and a patient’s eggs must be destroyed. We have informally investigated withdrawal of consent by sperm donors donating after 1 April 2005, when lifelong anonymity for gamete donors ended.
Amongst the latest, and ever-changing, pathways of death and dying, “suicide tourism” presents distinctive ethical, legal and practical challenges. The international media report that citizens from across the world are travelling or seeking to travel to Switzerland, where they hope to be helped to die. In this paper I aim to explore three issues associated with this phenomenon: how to define “suicide tourism” and “assisted suicide tourism”, in which the suicidal individual is helped to travel to take up the option of assisted dying; the (il)legality of assisted suicide tourism, particularly in the English legal system where there has been considerable recent activity; and the ethical dimensions of the practice. I will suggest that the suicide tourist—and specifically any accomplice thereof—risks springing a legal trap, but that there is good reason to prefer a more tolerant policy, premised on compromise and ethical pluralism.
Following advance directives in emergencies throws up some complicated problems, as Stephen Bonner and colleagues found. We asked an emergency doctor, a medical defence adviser, and an ethicist what they would do in the circumstances
The House of Lords in Purdy forced the DPP to issue offence-specific guidance on assisted suicide, but Jacqueline A Laing argues that the resulting interim policy adopted last September is unconstitutional, discriminatory and illegal. In July 2009, the law lords in R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] All ER (D) 335 required that the DPP publish guidelines for those contemplating assisting another to commit suicide. The DPP produced a consultation paper (23 September 2009) seeking to achieve a public consensus, albeit outside Parliament, on the factors to be taken into account in determining when not to prosecute assisted suicide. Although the consultation exercise is hailed by proponents of legislative change as a democratic, consensus-building and autonomy-enhancing initiative, there is much to suggest that, on the contrary, the guidance is unconstitutional, arbitrary and at odds with human rights law, properly understood.
As of 2008, surrogacy is legal and openly practised in various places; Japan, however, has no regulations or laws regarding surrogacy. This paper reports the situation of surrogacy in Japan and in five other regions (the USA, the UK, Taiwan, Korea and France) to clarify the pros and cons of prohibiting surrogacy, along with the problems and issues relating to surrogacy compensation.
Brain imaging has allowed a man who was previously considered unconscious to answer a series of yes-or-no questions. The study, published this week in the New England Journal of Medicine1, challenges clinicians' definition of consciousness and provides an unprecedented opportunity to communicate with those who show no outward signs of awareness.
Background The differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness is challenging. The rate of misdiagnosis is approximately 40%, and new methods are required to complement bedside testing, particularly if the patient's capacity to show behavioral signs of awareness is diminished. Conclusions These results show that a small proportion of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state have brain activation reflecting some awareness and cognition. Careful clinical examination will result in reclassification of the state of consciousness in some of these patients. This technique may be useful in establishing basic communication with patients who appear to be unresponsive.
This study investigates the use of CDS in the United Kingdom. In total, 18.7% (17.3–20.1) of the doctors attending a dying patient reported the use of CDS. CDS was more likely when patients were younger or were dying of cancer. Specialists in care of the elderly were least likely to report the use of CDS; doctors in other hospital specialties were most likely to report its use. CDS was associated with a higher rate of requests from patients or relatives for a hastened death and with a greater incidence of other end-of-life decisions containing some intent to end life by the doctor. Doctors supporting legalization of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, or who were nonreligious, were more likely to report using CDS. There was palliative care team involvement in half of all CDS cases, and prescription of opioids alone for sedation occurred in one-fifth of the cases but was not reported by specialists in palliative care.
The new parenthood provisions set out in Part 2 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 have been attacked as dangerous and radical, offering a 'lego-kit model of family life' and a 'magical mystery tour' in how legal fatherhood is to be determined. In this paper, we explain what is innovative about these new provisions but also explore what they owe to deep-rooted traditional assumptions about the family. Relying both on published documentation relating to this reform process and a small number of key actor interviews, we trace the imprint of what Fineman has described as the 'sexual family' model on the provisions. We conclude that the way that parenthood is framed within the legislation relies on a number of important normative assumptions which received very little scrutiny in this process. We also highlight a number of tensions within this framing which, we suggest, may create future problems for judicial determination.
Doctors and healthcare professionals could face a higher risk of prosecution if they help patients take their own lives according to new guidelines published by the Director of Public Prosecutions Keir Starmer QC last week. The ‘Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ comes seven months after the House of Lords ruling in the Purdy case which required the DPP to clarify its approach to assisted dying. The new guidelines follow a consultation which attached 4,710 responses and replace the interim policy issued in September last year with a set of 16 factors in favour of prosecution and six against. The main thrust of the new policy is that individuals driven by compassion will be unlikely to be prosecuted if this was their guiding motive. Those motivated by gain would be.
By attempting to avoid accusations that he is creating a regulatory regime, the DPP in his final policy on assisted-suicide prosecutions has wrongly exposed those with much-needed medical expertise to the risk of prosecution, says Penney Lewis
This article examines the implications for patient care, and for the future of rationing within the NHS, of the recent decision to permit NHS patients to supplement their care by paying for medicines — mainly expensive new cancer drugs — which are not available within the NHS. The starting point is the recommendations of the Richards' Report and their implementation through new guidance issued by the DoH and NICE. Practical challenges arise from the insistence upon the 'separate' delivery of self-funded medicines, and more flexible cost-effectiveness thresholds for end of life medicines may have repercussions for other patients. While undoubtedly part of the trend towards explicit rationing, top-up fees might also represent a significant step towards regarding the NHS as a core, basic service. Finally, the issue of top-up fees is located within the broader context of current cancer research priorities and persisting health inequalities.
Until 2008, if doctors followed the General Medical Council's (GMC's) guidance on providing information prior to obtaining a patient's consent to treatment, they would be going beyond what was technically required by the law. It was hoped that the common law would catch up with this guidance and encourage respect for patients' autonomy by facilitating informed decision-making. Regrettably, this has not occurred. For once, the law's inability to keep up with changing medical practice and standards is not the problem. The authors argue that while the common law has moved forward and started to recognise the importance of patient autonomy and informed decision-making, the GMC has taken a step back in their 2008 guidance on consent. Indeed, doctors are now required to tell their patients less than they were in 1998 when the last guidance was produced. This is an unfortunate development and the authors urge the GMC to revisit their guidance.
Following the House of Lords' decision in Purdy, the Director of Public Prosecutions issued an interim policy for prosecutors setting out the factors to be considered when deciding whether a prosecution in an assisted suicide case is in the public interest. This paper considers the interim policy, the subsequent public consultation and the resulting final policy. Key aspects of the policy are examined, including the condition of the victim, the decision to commit suicide and the role of organised or professional assistance. The inclusion of assisted suicides which take place within England and Wales makes the informal legal change realised by the policy more significant than was originally anticipated.
Surveys in different countries (e.g. the UK, Belgium and The Netherlands) show a marked recent increase in the incidence of continuous deep sedation at the end of life (CDS). Several hypotheses can be formulated to explain the increasing performance of this practice. In this paper we focus on what we call the ‘natural death’ hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that acceptance of CDS has spread rapidly because death after CDS can be perceived as a ‘natural’ death by medical practitioners, patients' relatives and patients. We attempt to show that the label ‘natural’ cannot be unproblematically applied to the nature of this end-of-life practice. We argue that the labeling of death following CDS as ‘natural’ death is related to a complex set of mechanisms which facilitate the use of this practice. However, our criticism does not preclude the view that CDS may be clinically and ethically justified in many cases.
The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.
The ‘elusive’ concept of ‘impairment’ was introduced into the General Medical Council's Fitness to Practise Procedures in 2002. Its function was ostensibly to bring all forms of fitness to practise allegations against doctors under a unifying concept and thereby reduce procedural complexity. This paper strives to illuminate the application of ‘impairment’ of fitness to practise with reference to a year of fitness to practise decision making by the General Medical Council (GMC). It concludes that impairment has brought with it a redemptive style of resolving matters of
However, further advances are under threat in the UK from inflexible laws, cumbersome licence requirements and fear of liability. Here we report a sequence of events that led to a UK clinical scientist withdrawing from participation in an international transplant research study in receipt of research ethics approval. We highlight the difficulties encountered and discuss possible solutions which, we believe, would promote legitimate research in the interest of the common good. We also contend that the current human tissue legislation should be replaced by a legal framework more responsive to the importance of scientific innovation for clinical service development in this field.
This paper explores the issue of donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation into a specified recipient. It argues that proper account should be taken of the principles underlying the Human Tissue Act 2004, which grant the donor a form of proprietary control. Three hypothetical scenarios are then used to draw out the implications of these principles for existing regulatory policy and the common law response to excised human organs. The paper concludes that the law should be understood as recognising ownership in organs removed from living and deceased persons and as offering opposition to the prohibition of directed donation that can only be coherently removed by reform of the 2004 Act.
This paper examines the historical role of law and politics in the adoption of smallpox vaccination in Britain, focusing primarily on the early Victorian period, when legislation was passed to enforce compulsory infantile vaccination. The primary thesis of the study is that law, and the processes through which it is created and maintained, provide a distinct “envelope of social order” (Jasanoff 2008, 764) within which competing and duelling interests and opinions about scientific innovation find origin, expression, and debate. Consequently, the manner in which law responds to science and its impact on society is neither static nor self-evident, but subject to mutable circumstances that are historically, politically, and socially situated. The paper is divided into two main parts. The first provides a brief history of vaccination and the second focuses on events surrounding the introduction of compulsory vaccination laws in England and Wales.