Abstract
Innovations in information technology (IT) have been responsible for
the rapid growth of computer simulation, which in turn has encouraged
IT innovation. However, there is a striking contrast between the
technological sophistication that drives and is driven by computer
simulation and the rudimentary, underdeveloped state of theory underpinning
the simulation endeavor. This article attempts to provide computer
simulation with a theoretical framework by the application of philosophy
of science to simulation validation. The authors discuss the key
elements of Popper’s theory of falsification and explore how simulation
validation is in fact anchored to Popper’s theory. Moreover, this
article suggests that a Popperian perspective encourages the review
of a validated model’s continuing validity, thereby potentially leading
to the construction of a new, improved model. Finally, we contrast
Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of science with Quine’s philosophical
system of holism and early-period Putnam’s scientific realism, both
of which discourage the building of better models.
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