Inbook,
The Contribution of Expected-Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict
page 143--169. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, (1989)
Abstract
The study of international conflict has languished without appreciable evidence of scientific progress for more than two millennia.1 Diplomatic and military histories found in the Old Testament and in the writings of such ancient scholars as Thucydides or Kautilya as well as those of more modern authors such as Clausewitz, Creasy, Richardson, and Morgenthau indicate that good foundations have been laid and give hope that such progress can be made. A common theme runs throughout the classics of international relations. That theme is the self-interested pursuit of gain by national leaders on their own behalf and on behalf of their nations. This is also the theme of research concerned with exchanges in markets. Indeed, Adam Smith's description of the operation of markets as an invisible hand guiding production and investment decisions through self-interested choice is a widely used description of the interaction of nations. Here, I apply a version of that perspective--expected-utility theory-to the study of international conflict.
