Article,

Political Business Cycles and the Process of Economic Policymaking

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American Politics Quarterly, 16 (1): 99 (1988)

Abstract

Political business cycle models of economic policymaking have been welcomed by both political scientists and economists. They improve on economic approaches by explicitly modeling a political component (the electoral incentive) in the economic policymaking process. And they improve on previous political science work by supplanting the case study-dominated institutional literature with a highly abstract, quantitative method. More than a decade's empirical work on these models has shown that early versions abstracted too radically from the details of political institutions and processes, and various ad hoc reformulations, have sought to improve the theory's explanatory power. This article reviews the political business cycle literature, placing it into the perspective of the trade-off between parsimonious, nomothetic approaches and more detailed, contextualized approaches to policy studies. On the basis of this review, an alternative model of the economic policymaking process is proposed and outlined. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of American Politics Quarterly is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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