Abstract
Ah hoc networks offer increased coverage by using multihop communication.
This architecture makes services more vulnerable to internal attacks
coming from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt
the network, also referred to as Byzantine attacks. In this work,
we examine the impact of several Byzantine attacks performed by individual
or colluding attackers. We propose ODSBR, the first on-demand routing
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks that provides resilience to
Byzantine attacks caused by individual or colluding nodes. The protocol
uses an adaptive probing technique that detects a malicious link
after log n faults have occurred, where n is the length of the path.
Problematic links are avoided by using a route discovery mechanism
that relies on a new metric that captures adversarial behavior. Our
protocol never partitions the network and bounds the amount of damage
caused by attackers. We demonstrate through simulations ODSBR's effectiveness
in mitigating Byzantine attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these
attacks versus the adversary's effort gives insights into their relative
strengths, their interaction, and their importance when designing
multihop wireless routing protocols.
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