%0 Journal Article %1 GomezGardenes2007 %A Gardeñes, Gómez %A Campillo, M. %A Floría, L. M. %A Moreno, Y. %D 2007 %I American Physical Society %J Physical Review Letters %K coevolution evolution game-theory networks prisoners-dilemma %N 10 %P 108103 %R 10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103 %T Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies %V 98 %X In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma, a two-player game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate (pure cooperators), always defect (pure defectors), and those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact, the size of the later set is the biggest for a wide range of the ” stimulus to defect” parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is enhanced.

@article{GomezGardenes2007, abstract = {In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma, a two-player game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate (pure cooperators), always defect (pure defectors), and those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact, the size of the later set is the biggest for a wide range of the ” stimulus to defect” parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is enhanced.}, added-at = {2011-02-08T13:12:29.000+0100}, author = {Gardeñes, Gómez and Campillo, M. and Floría, L. M. and Moreno, Y.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2df56f1c0efd21e50e1e8c5be30010174/rincedd}, doi = {10.1103/PhysRevLett.98.108103}, interhash = {6a5aa01cfadfcca95c7bc51da06f243e}, intrahash = {df56f1c0efd21e50e1e8c5be30010174}, journal = {Physical Review Letters}, keywords = {coevolution evolution game-theory networks prisoners-dilemma}, number = 10, pages = 108103, publisher = {American Physical Society}, timestamp = {2011-02-08T13:12:29.000+0100}, title = {Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies}, volume = 98, year = 2007 }