%0 Journal Article %1 BykowskyCL1995 %A Bykowsky, Mark M. %A Cull, Robert J. %A Ledyard, John O. %D 2000 %J Journal of Regulatory Economics %K imported %P 205-228 %T Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem %V 17 %X Dissatisfaction with previous assignment mechanisms and the desire to raise revenue induced Congress to grant the FCC authority to auction radio licencses. Among other things, synergies among license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licneses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive." Experiements indicate that a combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a "threshold" problem appear overblown when bidders for small packages can communicate.

@article{BykowskyCL1995, abstract = {Dissatisfaction with previous assignment mechanisms and the desire to raise revenue induced Congress to grant the FCC authority to auction radio licencses. Among other things, synergies among license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licneses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive." Experiements indicate that a combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a "threshold" problem appear overblown when bidders for small packages can communicate.}, added-at = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200}, author = {Bykowsky, Mark M. and Cull, Robert J. and Ledyard, John O.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20a5ee062a9da84c79a0a3ee63b83da14/jmm}, description = {JMM master bibtex}, interhash = {38e6761a13baa7f4c7fbb80d57750c7f}, intrahash = {0a5ee062a9da84c79a0a3ee63b83da14}, jmm_note = {138}, journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics}, keywords = {imported}, pages = {205-228}, timestamp = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200}, title = {Mutually Destructive Bidding: The {FCC} Auction Design Problem}, volume = 17, year = 2000 }