%0 Journal Article %1 citeulike:378103 %A Keijzer, Fred %D 2002 %E Ziemke, Tom %J Cognitive Systems Research %K representation embodied philosophy cognition %P 275--288 %T Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition %U http://aya.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/KeijzerRepresentation2002.pdf %V 3 %X The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view, however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.

@article{citeulike:378103, abstract = {The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view, however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.}, added-at = {2006-09-19T02:44:52.000+0200}, author = {Keijzer, Fred}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2061d5fb97aa62e5b102b061562f1a10c/yish}, citeulike-article-id = {378103}, editor = {Ziemke, Tom}, interhash = {5e3f35c00d9e8a5c99e1396b53dbc506}, intrahash = {061d5fb97aa62e5b102b061562f1a10c}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, keywords = {representation embodied philosophy cognition}, pages = {275--288}, priority = {3}, timestamp = {2006-09-19T02:44:52.000+0200}, title = {Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition}, url = {http://aya.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/KeijzerRepresentation2002.pdf}, volume = 3, year = 2002 }