%0 Journal Article %1 RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:41:y:1986:i:2:p:153-72 %A Cauley, Jon %A Sandler, Todd %A Cornes, Richard %D 1986 %J Public Finance = Finances publiques %K action collective cost game group size theory transaction %N 2 %P 153-72 %T Nonmarket Institutional Structures: Conjectures, Distribution, and Allocative Efficiency %U http://ideas.repec.org/a/pfi/pubfin/v41y1986i2p153-72.html %V 41 %X This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.

@article{RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:41:y:1986:i:2:p:153-72, abstract = { This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.}, added-at = {2010-09-15T11:57:13.000+0200}, author = {Cauley, Jon and Sandler, Todd and Cornes, Richard}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2bbdf0d51b12de4af93f2fe2c5026bfbd/emmalila}, interhash = {802aa7252efc2d9e8a08d06cba352065}, intrahash = {bbdf0d51b12de4af93f2fe2c5026bfbd}, journal = {Public Finance = Finances publiques}, keywords = {action collective cost game group size theory transaction}, number = 2, pages = {153-72}, timestamp = {2010-09-15T11:57:13.000+0200}, title = {Nonmarket Institutional Structures: Conjectures, Distribution, and Allocative Efficiency}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/pfi/pubfin/v41y1986i2p153-72.html}, volume = 41, year = 1986 }