Abstract
This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto, de re and de se belief reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume syntactic distinctions
between all three types of reports. I then propose a new, unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classicaltheory. These are: (i) modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involvesa modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The second involves treating acquaintance relationsas second-order presuppositions, to be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if necessary.The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specificsubclass of de se reports characterized by special ‘de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmaticresolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual resolution process nonetheless ensures adequateoutput truth conditions for a variety of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic systemto the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals.
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