%0 Conference Paper %1 ls_leimeister %A Hupe, Anna %A Bretschneider, Ulrich %B International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) %C Hyderabad, India %D 2023 %K Adverse_Selection Crowdwork Moral_Hazard Principal_Agent_Theorem Smart_Contract itegpub pub_ahu pub_ubr %T Revolutionizing Crowdworking Campaigns: Conquering Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with the Help of Smart Contracts %U https://pubs.wi-kassel.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/JML_955.pdf %X Crowdworking is increasingly being applied by companies to outsource tasks beyond their core competencies flexibly and cost-effectively to an unknown group. However, the anonymous and financially incentivized nature of crowdworkers creates information asymmetries and conflicts of interest, leading to inefficiencies and intensifying the principal-agent problem. Our paper offers a solution to the widespread problem of inefficient Crowdworking campaigns. We first derive the currently applied Crowdworking campaign process based on a qualitative study. Subsequently, we identify the broadest adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the process. We then analyze how the blockchain application of smart contracts can counteract those challenges and develop a process model that maps a Crowdworking campaign using smart contracts. We explain how our developed process significantly reduces adverse selection and moral hazard at each stage. Thus, our research provides approaches to make online labor more attractive and transparent for companies and online workers.

@inproceedings{ls_leimeister, abstract = {Crowdworking is increasingly being applied by companies to outsource tasks beyond their core competencies flexibly and cost-effectively to an unknown group. However, the anonymous and financially incentivized nature of crowdworkers creates information asymmetries and conflicts of interest, leading to inefficiencies and intensifying the principal-agent problem. Our paper offers a solution to the widespread problem of inefficient Crowdworking campaigns. We first derive the currently applied Crowdworking campaign process based on a qualitative study. Subsequently, we identify the broadest adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the process. We then analyze how the blockchain application of smart contracts can counteract those challenges and develop a process model that maps a Crowdworking campaign using smart contracts. We explain how our developed process significantly reduces adverse selection and moral hazard at each stage. Thus, our research provides approaches to make online labor more attractive and transparent for companies and online workers.}, added-at = {2023-10-24T13:45:17.000+0200}, address = {Hyderabad, India}, author = {Hupe, Anna and Bretschneider, Ulrich}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20dbd535e2df6be0f08fc5de709168113/ls_leimeister}, booktitle = {International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS)}, eventdate = {10-13 Dec 2023}, eventtitle = {International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS)}, interhash = {e72b1107c554299f2dcd62a377369e7e}, intrahash = {0dbd535e2df6be0f08fc5de709168113}, keywords = {Adverse_Selection Crowdwork Moral_Hazard Principal_Agent_Theorem Smart_Contract itegpub pub_ahu pub_ubr}, language = {English}, timestamp = {2023-12-30T14:15:04.000+0100}, title = {Revolutionizing Crowdworking Campaigns: Conquering Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with the Help of Smart Contracts}, url = {https://pubs.wi-kassel.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/JML_955.pdf}, venue = {Hyderabad, India}, year = 2023 }