Seriously ill children under 16 may be forced to take life-saving medical treatment against their wishes - but only after their maturity and viewpoint have been carefully considered, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled.
Drawing upon psychological and feminist theory to explore the notion of reproductive autonomy, central to my analysis is that its value lies in its instrumentality in fostering basic human needs and one’s sense of self. Exploring the value of reproductive autonomy by reference to human needs not only underpins the importance of that value, but also fleshes out ideas as to why protection of one’s physical integrity in the reproductive realm constitutes such an extreme situation, and is particularly commanding of our respect. Such an account is not only key to exploring important aspects of the nature and limits of the concept of reproductive autonomy, but also provides us with a promising and honest framework for addressing cases like Evans 2004, those involving third-party challenges to abortion decision-making, and perhaps most significantly of all, for reconciling these difficult cases with our equal respect for all reproductive desires, whether to reproduce or to avoid reproduction.
Politically strident debates surrounding end-of-life decisionmaking have surfaced once again, this time across the Atlantic in Italy. Eluana Englaro died early this year after a prolonged court fight, causing the international press to compare her case to that of Theresa Marie Schiavo, who passed away in 2005 in Florida after nearly sparking constitutional crises on both state and federal levels. In many respects, the facts of Ms. Englaro’s case are similar to Schiavo, but a close analysis of Englaro leads to the surprising conclusion that the Italian Court of Cassazione in that case actually enunciated a broader, stronger right to make end-of-life decisions than has the United States Supreme Court thus far in America.