Economic theory has investigated the optimal behavior of
rational agents in auction and bargaining situations. We apply
the theory to the design of automated negotiation protocols. In
particular, in what situations are restricted protocols suffcient
to achieve all the same outcomes that a more complete, flexible
protocol could achieve?
%0 Journal Article
%1 Cranor00
%A Cranor, Lorrie Faith
%A Resnick, Paul
%D 2000
%J Netnomics
%K game negotiation, design, mechanism commerce, trust security, commitment, electronic theory,
%P 1--23
%T Protocols for Automated Negotiations with Buyer Anonymity and
Seller Reputations
%V 2
%X Economic theory has investigated the optimal behavior of
rational agents in auction and bargaining situations. We apply
the theory to the design of automated negotiation protocols. In
particular, in what situations are restricted protocols suffcient
to achieve all the same outcomes that a more complete, flexible
protocol could achieve?
@article{Cranor00,
abstract = {Economic theory has investigated the optimal behavior of
rational agents in auction and bargaining situations. We apply
the theory to the design of automated negotiation protocols. In
particular, in what situations are restricted protocols suffcient
to achieve all the same outcomes that a more complete, flexible
protocol could achieve?},
added-at = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200},
author = {Cranor, Lorrie Faith and Resnick, Paul},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ec602f576b6c07563bf12c2bd14a3dd7/jmm},
description = {JMM master bibtex},
interhash = {83fd46d8286c363ef43587f9e0c9a554},
intrahash = {ec602f576b6c07563bf12c2bd14a3dd7},
journal = {Netnomics},
keywords = {game negotiation, design, mechanism commerce, trust security, commitment, electronic theory,},
pages = {1--23},
timestamp = {2006-09-13T17:44:28.000+0200},
title = {Protocols for Automated Negotiations with Buyer Anonymity and
Seller Reputations},
volume = 2,
year = 2000
}