According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to Φ involves, among other
things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted
person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will Φ. In recent years, several
philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that
the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some
kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic
disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and
employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that
reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept
of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of
relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust.
Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for
trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an
account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides
independent reasons supporting a doxastic account.
%0 Journal Article
%1 keren2014trust
%A Keren, Arnon
%D 2014
%I Springer
%J Synthese
%K epistemology learning philosophy trust
%P 1-23
%T Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account
%U https://lecturers.haifa.ac.il/he/hcc/akeren/Documents/keren-trust_belief_pra-final-draft.pdf
%X According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to Φ involves, among other
things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted
person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will Φ. In recent years, several
philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that
the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some
kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic
disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and
employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that
reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept
of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of
relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust.
Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for
trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an
account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides
independent reasons supporting a doxastic account.
@article{keren2014trust,
abstract = {According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to Φ involves, among other
things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted
person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will Φ. In recent years, several
philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that
the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some
kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, or a non-doxastic
disposition to rely upon her. This paper offers a new account of reasons for trust and
employs the account to defend a doxastic account of trust. The paper argues that
reasons for trust are preemptive reasons for action or belief. Thus the Razian concept
of preemptive reasons, which arguably plays a key role in our understanding of
relations of authority, is also central to our understanding of relations of trust.
Furthermore, the paper argues that acceptance of a preemptive account of reasons for
trust supports the adoption of a doxastic account of trust, for acceptance of such an
account both neutralizes central objections to doxastic accounts of trust and provides
independent reasons supporting a doxastic account. },
added-at = {2015-01-07T17:04:07.000+0100},
author = {Keren, Arnon},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ef4e7f4723c970250afedfb26202104b/yish},
interhash = {8be512b316cf59124af9238b012ca4b0},
intrahash = {ef4e7f4723c970250afedfb26202104b},
journal = {Synthese},
keywords = {epistemology learning philosophy trust},
pages = {1-23},
publisher = {Springer},
timestamp = {2015-01-07T17:04:07.000+0100},
title = {Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account},
url = {https://lecturers.haifa.ac.il/he/hcc/akeren/Documents/keren-trust_belief_pra-final-draft.pdf},
year = 2014
}