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The Fewest Clues Problem.

, , , , and . FUN, volume 49 of LIPIcs, page 12:1-12:12. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, (2016)

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Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling., , , and . EC, page 123-152. ACM, (2023)Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Two-Player Approximate Correlated Equilibria., and . Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., (2017)Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design. Princeton University, USA, (2020)Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values., , and . CoRR, (2018)Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all., , and . CoRR, (2016)Coding in Undirected Graphs Is Either Very Helpful or Not Helpful at All., , and . ITCS, volume 67 of LIPIcs, page 18:1-18:18. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, (2017)Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence., , , and . ITCS, volume 151 of LIPIcs, page 3:1-3:25. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, (2020)The menu complexity of öne-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design., , and . SODA, page 2026-2035. SIAM, (2018)Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules., , and . ITCS, volume 67 of LIPIcs, page 35:1-35:20. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, (2017)Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents., , , , and . EC, page 193-256. ACM, (2020)