J. Elias, F. Martignon, K. Avrachenkov, und G. Neglia. INFOCOM'10: Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications, Seite 41--45. Piscataway, NJ, USA, IEEE Press, (2010)
Zusammenfassung
In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, where connectivity is due to Autonomous Systems' choices, but also of overlay networks, where each user client can decide the set of connections to establish. Recent works have used game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash Equilibrium, to characterize stable networks created by a set of selfish agents. The majority of these works assume that users are completely non-cooperative, leading, in most cases, to inefficient equilibria.
%0 Conference Paper
%1 1833524
%A Elias, Jocelyne
%A Martignon, Fabio
%A Avrachenkov, Konstantin
%A Neglia, Giovanni
%B INFOCOM'10: Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
%C Piscataway, NJ, USA
%D 2010
%I IEEE Press
%K games network
%P 41--45
%T Socially-aware network design games
%U http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1833524
%X In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, where connectivity is due to Autonomous Systems' choices, but also of overlay networks, where each user client can decide the set of connections to establish. Recent works have used game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash Equilibrium, to characterize stable networks created by a set of selfish agents. The majority of these works assume that users are completely non-cooperative, leading, in most cases, to inefficient equilibria.
%@ 978-1-4244-5836-3
@inproceedings{1833524,
abstract = {In many scenarios network design is not enforced by a central authority, but arises from the interactions of several self-interested agents. This is the case of the Internet, where connectivity is due to Autonomous Systems' choices, but also of overlay networks, where each user client can decide the set of connections to establish. Recent works have used game theory, and in particular the concept of Nash Equilibrium, to characterize stable networks created by a set of selfish agents. The majority of these works assume that users are completely non-cooperative, leading, in most cases, to inefficient equilibria.},
added-at = {2010-09-10T09:43:04.000+0200},
address = {Piscataway, NJ, USA},
author = {Elias, Jocelyne and Martignon, Fabio and Avrachenkov, Konstantin and Neglia, Giovanni},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22df039a400a8e0a17fe82f8ff9a5f2cd/sueselbeck},
booktitle = {INFOCOM'10: Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications},
description = {Socially-aware network design games},
interhash = {f71ac005d56ec038a5164690a4b73c83},
intrahash = {2df039a400a8e0a17fe82f8ff9a5f2cd},
isbn = {978-1-4244-5836-3},
keywords = {games network},
location = {San Diego, California, USA},
pages = {41--45},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
timestamp = {2010-09-10T09:43:04.000+0200},
title = {Socially-aware network design games},
url = {http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1833524},
year = 2010
}