This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.
%0 Journal Article
%1 RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:41:y:1986:i:2:p:153-72
%A Cauley, Jon
%A Sandler, Todd
%A Cornes, Richard
%D 1986
%J Public Finance = Finances publiques
%K action collective cost game group size theory transaction
%N 2
%P 153-72
%T Nonmarket Institutional Structures: Conjectures, Distribution, and Allocative Efficiency
%U http://ideas.repec.org/a/pfi/pubfin/v41y1986i2p153-72.html
%V 41
%X This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.
@article{RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:41:y:1986:i:2:p:153-72,
abstract = { This paper analyzes nonmarket institutional structure in which policymakers from two or more governments negotiate to commonly provide a pure public good or to internalize an externality. Various equilibrium notions for the linkage are examined, including Nash, non-Nash, and Pareto. The theoretical analysis indicates when distributional aspects can be separated from efficiency considerations for a nonmarket linkage. In addition, the authors demonstate that the likelihood of initial formation of such a linkage is related to the number of participants, the type of conjecture formed, and the mix between fixed and variable negotiation costs.},
added-at = {2010-09-15T11:57:13.000+0200},
author = {Cauley, Jon and Sandler, Todd and Cornes, Richard},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2bbdf0d51b12de4af93f2fe2c5026bfbd/emmalila},
interhash = {802aa7252efc2d9e8a08d06cba352065},
intrahash = {bbdf0d51b12de4af93f2fe2c5026bfbd},
journal = {Public Finance = Finances publiques},
keywords = {action collective cost game group size theory transaction},
number = 2,
pages = {153-72},
timestamp = {2010-09-15T11:57:13.000+0200},
title = {Nonmarket Institutional Structures: Conjectures, Distribution, and Allocative Efficiency},
url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/pfi/pubfin/v41y1986i2p153-72.html},
volume = 41,
year = 1986
}