The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view,
however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.
%0 Journal Article
%1 citeulike:378103
%A Keijzer, Fred
%D 2002
%E Ziemke, Tom
%J Cognitive Systems Research
%K representation embodied philosophy cognition
%P 275--288
%T Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition
%U http://aya.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/KeijzerRepresentation2002.pdf
%V 3
%X The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view,
however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.
@article{citeulike:378103,
abstract = {The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view,
however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning.},
added-at = {2006-09-19T02:44:52.000+0200},
author = {Keijzer, Fred},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2061d5fb97aa62e5b102b061562f1a10c/yish},
citeulike-article-id = {378103},
editor = {Ziemke, Tom},
interhash = {5e3f35c00d9e8a5c99e1396b53dbc506},
intrahash = {061d5fb97aa62e5b102b061562f1a10c},
journal = {Cognitive Systems Research},
keywords = {representation embodied philosophy cognition},
pages = {275--288},
priority = {3},
timestamp = {2006-09-19T02:44:52.000+0200},
title = {Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition},
url = {http://aya.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/KeijzerRepresentation2002.pdf},
volume = 3,
year = 2002
}